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Abstract
Hyundai Motor Company which started off as a small fish in a big sea (Hyundai
Conglomerate) paved its way out successfully and established itself as an independent
group from the conglomerate. Hyundai, with its officious power across the globe
and, particularly, in South Korea in the automobile industry, has one of the most
complex yet fascinating governance structures. Being the second largest contributor
to the GDP of South Korea after Samsung and having a market share of 51.3%
domestically in the automobile industry, Hyundai has faced its share of criticism
owing to its anti labor union approach and, also, owing to its internalization of
supply chain management. The paper focuses on the growth of Hyundai and its
inward and outward investment structure. The paper questions the ability of Hyundai
to become a mega corporation by focusing on its governance structure. The paper
further elaborates on its compliance and disclosure regime in the field of Corporate
Social Responsibility and explores how far the business structure adopted by Hyundai
works in its favor to become one of the leading automobile contenders in the market.
Keywords: Compliance regime, Disclosure regime, Hyundai Motor Company,
Supply-chain management..

CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
The traditional global framework saw a dominance of looking to a democratic
institution for defining an stable state. The medium of expression to exert
authority by the state was attributed exclusively to law. The policy framing
and regulations were defined within the boundaries of state-defined law. The
actual realization of the second phase of globalization which was initiated
post Second World War started diminishing the excessive reliance on a state
34
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governed entity.1 Breaking the traditional boundaries, private and public
enterprises swiftly moved out of the state precincts and started operating at an
international level. The internationalization of national entities has created a
conflict between the regulatory approach adopted within the confines of the
state defined law and regulatory approach driven by the norms operating on
the institutions within, between and beyond the state.2
The process of globalization paved the way for enterprises to become
polycentric3 and, hence, started transcending beyond national laws. Most of
the multinational corporations started framing their own rules of governance or
bowed down to the global economic regulations. However, the strong framework
of national law as a regulating approach, instilled amongst the policy makers,
led to the dwindling reliance on growing international regulation standards,
in spite of them being plagued with inconsistency and unenforceability.4 The
overpowering skirmish between regulatory approaches has missed the mark.
The main challenges faced by the world order with multinational corporations
might not be MNE themselves, but could be the immense power they have
come to achieve as a result of transnational supply and production chains, or
it could be attributed to them becoming self-regulators,5 There are two schools
of thought, one which emphasize on these transnational organizations being
the subject of regulation which must be achieved by domestic laws adapting to
1

2

3

4
5

Jim Sheffield, Andrey Korotayev, Leonid Grinin, ‘Globalization: Yesterday, today, and
tomorrow’ <https://www.hse.ru/data/2013/05/23/1299088719/Globalization.pdf>
accessed on 05/02/2019.
Fabrice Henard, Leslie Diamond, Deborah Roseveare, ‘Approaches to Internationalisation
and their Implications for Strategic Management and Institutional Practice’ (2012)
<http://www.oecd.org/education/imhe/Approaches%20to%20internationalisation%20
-%20final%20-%20web.pdf> accessed on 05/02/2019.
Larry Kata Backer, ‘Harmonizing Law in an Era of Globalization: Convergence,
Divergence, and Resistance’ (2007) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1026723> accessed on 05/ 02/2019.
Ibid
John Gerald Ruggie, ‘Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and relative
autonomy’ <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/rego.12154> accessed
05/04/2018.
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changes as per international movement.6 The opposers of this view think that
the reliance of policymakers on law as an instrument of regulation is overrated,
and law no more enjoys the monopoly7 as the only instrument of regulation.8
The trans-nationalization and globalization have weakened the old law
making monopolies, and powerful non-state actors have superseded these
rule-making monopolies in their influence on the world order.9 These nonstate actors have given rise to a parallel system of rulemaking vis a vis a formal
rule making system.10 This system finds its progression in the behavior of the
participants and is characterized by self-awareness, a guild-like entity which
also interacts with formal legal systems through which they sometimes find
expression.11 One of the significant non-state actors in this private law making
is the multinational corporation. This influential non-state actor has hazed
the source of the development of international order.12 The significance that
geography once held in the political setup has diminished with increased
globalization, and distances have lost their meaning.13 The private entities have
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

See: The civil society and the developed state take this view “Global Movement for a
Binding Treaty.” Treaty Alliance, ‘Global Movement for a Binding Treaty’ <http://www.
treatymovement. com/#/#> accesses on 05/08/2018. Also see: Statement to the Human Rights
Council in Support of the Initiative of a Group of States for a Legally Binding Instrument
on Transnational Corporations, Sept. 13, 2013 <http://www.stopcorporateimpunity.
org/?p=3830; accessed on 05/04/2018. U.N. Human Rights Council, ‘Promotion and
protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including
the right to development’ A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (24 June, 2014).
Ibid
Ibid
Larry Kata Backer, ‘Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global
Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator’ (2007) CONNECTICUT LAW
REVIEW 39(4). Accessed on 06/12/2020.
Ibid at 1749; Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: SelfContained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483, 492 (2006).
Ibid at 10
Ibid. Whether it is being sourced through legal norms by political processes or by the
behavior of the participants that constitute non-state actors.
Walter B.Wriston, The Twilight Of Sovereignty: How The Information Revolution Is
Transforming Our World, 61-62 (1992).
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moved beyond the boundaries and have a momentous bearing on the relation
between the states.14 The duties that a multinational (mega) corporation
has come to perform have muddled the distinction between the state and
the corporation. Nation state15 as a concept has evolved to also include the
growth of mega corporations. These mega corporations are characterized by
tremendous economic power, bearing heavily on the economy of the state,
engaging in “diplomatic” and ‘legislative activities,16 economies of scale,
influencing the monetary policies17 and a centralized monitoring and control
mechanism.18 Certain questions which seemed absolutely naïve a couple of
years ago have seemed to gain prominence today. For instance, what is the
impact multinational corporations have on the economies of the nations? What
is the impact of a multinational on the environment? What is the impact of a
Multinational on the wages of its employees, its suppliers, and on the industry?
What is the impact of multinationals on the employment measures of the
country? The answers to these questions point towards the scale on which a
multinational operates, and whether that multinational is fit to be called as
a mega corporation. The initial understanding of mega corporation meant a
conglomerate which had a monopolistic control in multiple markets and had
a presence in both the horizontal and vertical production and supply chains.19
The mega corporation was characterized as extremely powerful, with its private
armies, having a sovereign territory, and a vertically integrated supply chain,

14 Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 Me. L. Rev. 129 (2008) <https://
digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/4>
15 Putting aside the technical difference between nation and state, the author treats them
as synonyms.
16 Ibid at 15.
17 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/234110848.pdf
18 https://elibrary.gnlu.ac.in:2111/stable/pdf/40751857.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_
SYC-5187_SYC-5188%252F5188&refreqid=excelsior%3Af4ccd249dd1e9e544a31ee1d
476d6e02The Essence of the Megacorporation: Shared Context, not Structural Hierarchy
Sumantra Ghoshal, Peter Moran and Luis Almeida-Costa
19 Arthur Weststeijn, ‘The VOC as a Company-State: Debating Seventeenth-Century Dutch
Colonial Expansion,(2014) Cambridge University Press 38(1)
37

Vol. 15

National Law School Journal

2019-20

and could easily usurp the law.20 For instance, the Dutch East India Company21
was established as a trading company which diversified itself into multiple
businesses and had a private army to look after its empire.22 However, the
modern-day mega corporations might not possess all the characteristics of the
early mega corporations but do resemble them in the power they have come to
exert on the economies of the state, with their widespread influence on people
at large, as well as their instrumental role in policy making. The modern mega
corporations do not have private armies to protect their economy; instead they
protect it by monopolizing law-making in order to protect their empire. The
modern day mega corporations cannot usurp the law, but to a great extent,
they define law-making and work hand in hand with the government.
The process of internationalization23 has incentivized the companies to shift
from its gradual process, which has been argued by some scholars as being
‘dead,’ and instead adopt rapid internationalization. The intertwining concept
of “born global” and “accelerated internationalization” theory is not without
problems. This paper shall spell out the problem posed by this process using a
large dragon multinational as a case study.
The rapid development of East Asian Economy has profoundly provided the
best-case studies to coherently analyze the role of Multinational Corporations
in acquiring the character of mega-corporations in light of the power they have
come to possess owing to their size and their economic impact on the economy
and on the world. The case study of Hyundai Motor Company is a perfect
example and demonstrates its presence by the power it has come to exert on
20 Ibid.
21 Desjardins, Jeff (12 December 2017). "How today's tech giants compare to the massive
companies of empires past." <https://www.businessinsider.com/how-todays-tech-giantscompare-to-massive-companies-of-empires-past-2017-12?IR=T>
22 Ibid
23 See: Internationalization is defined as the process of adapting firms’ strategies, structures,
operations and resources to international environments (Calof and Beamish 1995)).
Romeo V. Turcan, ‘De-internationalization: A Conceptualization’ <https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/228240827_De-Internationalization_A_Conceptualization>
accessed on 05/09/2019.
38
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the economy of South Korea, and it has become an entity with weight and
content in the automobile industry world-wide.24
The story of rags to riches is best suited for describing the story of Hyundai
Motor Company. Hyundai Motor Company came into existence in 1967 with
an initiative of Hyundai Engineering and Construction who wanted an entity
to assemble American cars for local consumption.25 In 2005, it became the sixth
biggest automaker in the world and one of the biggest competitors to some of
the most established brands in the automobile sector.26 In 2006, it showed a
tremendous performance in sales and, also, in the sales to employment ratio.27
The Hyundai Motor Company was a part of Hyundai Motor Group which
existed as a chaebol in South Korea.28 Chaebols are defined as “a business group
consisting of large companies which are owned and managed by family members
or relatives in many diversified business areas.29 The Hyundai Chaebol that
came into existence in the late 1950s was established by a member of the Chung
family with the aid of the government. The government support proliferated
in the form of grants, preferential tax treatment and disposing of government
owned properties.30 Hyundai Chaebol was a financial conglomerate which was
marked by a circular shareholding of the Chung Family members.31 The fight
between the second generation directors of the Chung Family, which was also
called as ‘Strife of Princes’ led to the breaking off of Hyundai Motor Group
24 The Economist, ‘South Korea automotive, Key player- Hyundai Motor Group’
<http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1675316951/key-player-hyundai-motorgroup/2017-04-12> accessed on 05/11/2018.
25 William J. Holstein, ‘Strategy+Business’ (2013) <https://www.strategy-business.com/
article/00162?gko=8346f> accessed on 05/08/2019.
26 Ibid
27 The Economist, ‘The Retreat of the Global company’ (2017) <https://www.economist.
com/briefing/2017/01/28/the-retreat-of-the-global-company> accessed on 05/09/2019.
28 Ibid
29 Gyubin Choi, ‘North Korean Refugees in South Korea: Change and Challenge in
settlement support policy’ <file:///C:/Users/SHREYA/Desktop/kjis016-01-04.pdf>
accessed on 05/27/2019.
30 Ibid
31 Ibid at 14
39
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from Hyundai Group in 2000.32 The Hyundai Motor Group was formed with
Mong-Koo Chung as the Chairman.33
In view of the preliminary comments above, the assumption that one begins
with is that Hyundai Motors, having been regulated initially, has come to achieve
the power to self-regulate itself. This paper has been divided into five chapters.
The first and second chapters shall deal with the legal and organizational
structure adopted by Hyundai Motor Group in its operations. The chapters
shall critically discuss the structure it has adopted to penetrate the boundaries of
other nations. It shall focus on the process of internationalization that has been
embraced by Hyundai Motor Company to gain wide access to the international
markets and shall, also, analyze the downside of its strategy to acquire control
in other territories. It shall, also, discuss the circular shareholding pattern that
forms the dominant regulatory structure within the Hyundai Motor Group.
The third chapter shall deal with the inward and outward regulatory confines
that promote or restrict the expansion of Hyundai Motor Group at international
fora. This shall be further illustrated by the disclosure and compliance regime
that has persuaded the company’s expansive scope to be limited or made
broader. It shall set out the change in policies that has been brought about by
the company at its central level due to the changes in the laws at the subsidiary
country’s level and, contrastingly, the changes that have been brought at the
central level which have percolated to its subsidiaries. The fourth chapter deals
with how ‘soft’ law has transformed the internal regulation of a company, and
how far Hyundai Motor Group adhered to the ‘soft’ law by imbibing changes in
its internal regulation. This part deals with how Hyundai on various occasions
has observed CSR policies in its functioning and how, on various occasions, it
has dishonored it owing to its own interests. The fifth part of the paper shifts the
focus of Hyundai Motor Company from ‘being regulated’ to how HMC itself
regulates its supply chains, manifesting itself as a modern ‘guild’34 like entity.
32 Ibid at 14
33 Ibid at 14
34 The ancient guild meant a commercial group of entities acting like a self-sufficient entity
which is capable of managing its own affairs, legislating its own rules and governing its own
40
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CHAPTER II: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Korea witnessed a dark, rough patch of economic crises in the 1990s,
which could partly be attributed to the unavoidable economic turmoil that
Asian economies were undergoing and partly to the mechanism of business
functioning within Korea.35 A wide range of literature got attracted towards
the corporate governance mechanism prevalent in Korea and drew major
disparagement from all perspectives.36 The Chaebol system which drew major
inspiration from Confucian ethics, which was Korea’s State Religion, has spilled
over substantially into the management styles of Chaebols.37 The Confucian
social system was hierarchical, where the power trickled down from the father
to the eldest son.38 The same structure is analogous to the corporate structure
within Chaebols, where the chairman is the sole authority, and all the power
filters through him to the lower employees, constituting a top-down hierarchical
structure.39 The Hyundai Motor Group depicts the same top-down hierarchical
structure.40

35

36
37
38
39
40

employees. It was characterized as a close-knit Community which is transparent, yet not
transparent, and does business extremely secretively and has a very centralized decisionmaking system; and it is very powerful, has an extremely high shock absorbent capacity
and loyalty and innovation work hand in hand for them. Epstein, S.R.; Prak, Maarten,
eds. (2008). Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, Cambridge University Press.
See: 90% of the economy GDP was coming from 30 chaebols, which shows the immense
power of chaebols in the functioning of economy of Korea. Iain Marlow, ‘South Korea’s
chaebol problem’ <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/internationalbusiness/asian-pacific-business/south-koreas-chaebol-problem/article24116084/> accessed
on 05/15/2019.
Ibid at 12
Ibid at 12
Ibid at 12
Author’s views.
Russell D. Lansbury, ‘Globalization and Employment Relations in the Korean Auto
Industry: The Case of the Hyundai Motor Company in Korea, Canada and India’
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19761597.2016.1207423> accessed
on 05/10/2019.
41
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The corporate governance structure of Hyundai Motor Group is based
on the traditional system of corporate governance, an “insider dominated
framework.”41 This framework is dominated by no, or very little, separation of
corporate ownership and corporate control. The insider dominated corporate
governance of Hyundai Motor Group is owned and controlled by the closeknit Chung Family.42 The word Chaebol means wealth clan, wherein the rich
man becomes the head of the clan,43 and this was also prevalent in Hyundai
Motor Group headed by Chung Family.44 The other dominant feature of
Chaebol, which was also dominating in HMG, was the strategy of centralizing
production as much as possible with complete opaqueness to the outside and
the least influence of external management in the working of the Chaebol.45 The
process of integration was kept close knit to exert direct say in process, setting
prices as well as determining the adaptions in supply chain management. In
order to keep the outside interference to a bare minimum and exert maximum
control over the supply chain, HMG sourced all the products from its own
companies.46 The board of all companies under the Chaebol predominantly
constituted a tight network of people the Chung family could trust and over
whom they could exert their influence. The control exercised by Hyundai over
their supply chain was so absolute that they could also dictate the speed of
delivery, the prices right down to the supply chain, as well as the production
of raw materials, and also determine the logistics. The Hyundai Motor Group
adopted an equity-based approach, wherein the subsidiaries of Hyundai Motor
Company in other nations represented a closely controlled group of companies

41 Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon and Chang-Young Park, ‘A Conceptual Framework for
Corporate Governance Reform in South Korea’ <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezaccess.
libraries.psu.edu/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8683.00265> accessed on 05/05/2019.
42 Ibid
43 Carlos Tejada, ‘Money, Power, Family: Inside South Korea’s Chaebol’ <https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/south-korea-chaebol-samsung.html> accessed on
05/14/2018.
44 Ibid at 25
45 Ibid at 25
46 Ibid at 18
42
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which were allied with the parent company by way of shares and intermediate
subsidiary companies.
As held by OECD, “a foreign subsidiary may be seen as having relatively little
autonomy if it belongs to a large multinational group established in many
foreign countries, if it manufactures fairly standardized products, if the activities
of the members are largely integrated, and if the parent company holds a large
portion of the equity.”47 The other noteworthy feature of Hyundai Motor
Group Chaebol is the circular shareholding structure.48
A major reason for the swift expansion of Hyundai Motor Group could be
credited to the cross-shareholding structure, as can be seen in Figure 1.49
Under the cross-shareholding structure, each subsidiary that forms a part of
the group holds some percentage of stakes in the others, thereby restricting the
founding family owner’s stake to a minority in the controlling company.50 The
interlink of subsidiaries facilitate the movement of funds within the group as
well as incentivizes the group to establish a new subsidiary by merely pulling
out the money from another subsidiary instead of raising funds from scratch.51
Notwithstanding the minority stake of the holding family in the controlling
entity, they enjoy considerable influence over each subsidiary.52 The Chairman
Chung Mong Koo holds 6.96% stake in Hyundai Mobis which, in turn, holds
20.8% in Hyundai Motors in which Chung Mong’s stake is 3.99%. Hyundai
Motors holds 33.9% stake in Kia Motors which holds 16.9% in Hyundai
47 Korean LII, ‘Circular shareholding’ <http://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=Awrg
EaLHXwlb WloAOVE36At.;_ylu=X3oDMTByaDNhc2JxBHNlYwNzcgRw
b3MDMQRjb2xvA2dxMQR2dGlkAw--/RV=2/RE=1527369799/RO=10/
RU=http%3a%2f%2fwww.koreanlii.or.kr%2fw%2findex.php%2fCircular_shareholding/
RK=2/RS=Xx7XGP0HvmjjWHVlPd7Bo.tEECs-> accessed on 05/15/2019
48 Ibid
49 Global Capital, ‘Can Park Geun-hye peel back the chaebol’s power 18 Mar 2013 <https://
www.globalcapital.com/article/k33lqspsr12l/can-park-geun-hye-peel-back-the-chaebolspower> accessed on 05/08/2018.
50 Ibid
51 Ibid at 34
52 Ibid at 34
43
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Mobis.53 Chung does not hold any stake directly in Kia Motors which is why
Kia’s position is lower in the group structure.54 Even though Chung enjoys
minority shareholdings in the entities, the decision making in Hyundai
Motors is essentially centralized, and Chung enjoys excessive influence in the
subsidiaries of Hyundai Motor Group which reinforces the hierarchical structure
of Hyundai Motor Group. This can be exemplified by the fact that, in 2003,
even though Chung Family members owned only 4.8% shares, they enjoyed
31.9% of voting rights.55 There are some firms in the group which are owned
directly by Chung Mong Koo; for e.g., Glovis.56
The Hyundai Motor Group’s equity investment structure can be understood by
Figure 2. It is a combination of two forms: circular equity investment structure,
which has been dealt with above, and vertical equity investment structure
in which Hyundai Steel does not form a part. In this vertical structure, the
automakers and module makers separately hold and finance the subsidiaries
under them to maintain strong and stable relationships with their affiliates.57
Hyundai Motor Group, with its centralized and integrated production system,
has promulgated the strategy to produce products itself and enjoys direct say in
the process, sets target prices and adapts to supply chains.58 This furthers the
centralization of decision making within Hyundai Motor Group and results
in waning of separation between ownership and control.
53 Ibid at 34
54 Gregory W. Noble, ‘Fordism Light: Hyundai’s Challenge to Coordinated Capitalism’
[2010] BRIE Working Paper 186. Figure 1.
55 Ibid
56 Heitor Almeida, San Yong Park, Marti Subrahmanyam, Daniel Wolfenzon, ‘Valuation
and performance of firms in complex ownership structures: An application to Korean
chaebols 21 March 2007 <http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/docs/pdfs/Seminars/071falmeida.pdf> accessed on 05/15/2018
57 Kim Woojin, ‘An analysis on the low-cost production system of Hyundai Motor Company
focused on Wage-Labor Nexus’ <http://www.jspe.gr.jp/files/36kim-p.pdf> accessed on
05/17/2018
58 Chan K. Hahn, Edward A. Duplaga, Janet L. Hartley ‘Supply-Chain Synchronization:
Lessons from Hyundai Motor Company <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2e03/8ed95
f07e20d91ca5ed864df975b2891626a.pdf> accessed on 05/17/2019.
44

The Hyundai Model: A Quasi-Leviathan in the Making

CHAPTER III: LEGAL STRUCTURE: INWARD AND OUTWARD
INVESTMENT
The legal structure adopted by Hyundai Motor Group to enter into the global
phase of expansion can be divided into two perspectives: host state control over
inward investment, which takes place at the stage of entry and the post entry
stage, and home state control over outward investment.
The year 1987-88 saw a revamp in the Hyundai Motor Company by Se
Young Chung who shifted the focus of the organization from a functional to
a divisional organization.59 This induced motivation in the management and
an ability to cope with a diversified market. This ideology was followed by
his son Mong Chung who became the Chairman of Hyundai Motor Group.
The first phase of globalization was seen with the establishment of Hyundai
Motors America in 1985 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Hyundai Motor
Company.60 The adoption of wholly owned subsidiary model to penetrate
the international market was to endorse the culture of Hyundai group which
focused on centralized decision making.
It was in 1988 that HMC decided to build a manufacturing plant in Quebec
to assemble cars for the American Market.61 However, heavy reliance on
Korean sub-contractors, as well as strategy development for America being
developed in Korea, were analyzed as impediments for the growth of HMC
and, consequently, led to the declining sales of HMC in American Market.62 In
addition to the already existing problem, Hyundai had to overcome and adapt
to the change in the trade conditions in the US with introduction of NAFTA
59 UKESSAYS, 'Growth And Change Management In Hyundai' <https://www.ukessays.
com/essays/business/growth-and-change-management-in-hyundai-business-essay.php>
accessed on 05/04/2019.
60 Myeong-kee CHUNG, ‘Globalization Strategies of Korean Motor Vehicles Industries: A
Case Study of Hyundai’ <http://gerpisa.org/ancien-gerpisa/actes/22/22-5.pdf> accessed
on 05/14/2019.
61 Ibid at 24
62 Ibid at 24
45
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and EU.63 Hyundai, in order to achieve economies by cutting labor costs,
opened offshore manufacturing in South East Asia. India, which had recently
undergone liberalization, was open to investment from foreign companies
and, also, became a target of Hyundai due to cheap labor, and a wholly owned
subsidiary was set up in Chennai in 1997.64 Localizing assembling plants close to
the target market had become the most viable way for the companies to escape
the encumbrance of tariffs and shipping costs. This could be best achieved by
either entering into joint ventures with a local partner or establishing a wholly
owned subsidiary. Hyundai Motor Company most often preferred the wholly
owned subsidiary model, in line with the culture at the central management
in Korea which demanded high level of control and did not face substantial
resistance from any host country at the entry level except in China. Owing to
substantial flexibility of all states at stage of entry, and least control exercised
by the host country over Hyundai Motor Group subsidiaries, including in
China, HMG was allowed to assume its “Asian Plant” style of production in
their plants which was being used in their domestic plant in Korea.65
Post Hyundai’s successful attempt to enter into Europe, India and America by
way of setting up wholly owned subsidiaries, it directed its attention to China.
However, due to legal regulations in China, it faced resistance in following its
established wholly owned subsidiary model to keep strict vigilance and control
over the subsidiary. To ensure the benefits percolate to its economy and stateowned enterprises, the central government mandated the foreign automakers
to form a joint venture with a cap of 50% ownership with no more than two
SOEs.66 The ownership regulations in China posed an impediment to the
success of HMC’s expansion spree which was dominated by maximum control
by the parent company. The mandate by the Chinese government created an
63
64
65
66

Ibid at 24
Ibid at 24
Ibid at 24
Nicholas C. HOPE, FAN Gang, ‘The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese
Economy <https://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02Chapter+16.pdf >accessed on 05/27/2018.
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“obligated embeddedness” on the foreign automakers whose success depended
on the Chinese partner.67 The Hyundai Motor Company formed a 50-50 joint
venture with Beijing Automotive Holding Corp called Beijing Hyundai.68 The
extent of control exerted by the Chinese government could be gauged by the
drop in sales of HMC China by 50% with four plants ceasing production when
the issue of THAAD arose between China and South Korea.69 From this, it
could be inferred that Chinese government exercised immense control on the
commercial activities of foreign subsidiaries, undermining the control of HMC
Korea (refuting the deep embedded insider-dominated corporate governance
structure). China, being the host country, posed obstacles for Hyundai Motor
Company at pre-entry as well as post entry phase.70
Law governing the subsidiaries: The foreign subsidiaries of Hyundai Motor
Company are governed by general laws of the country where the subsidiary is
established. In Carlson v. Hyundai Motor Company,71 the personal jurisdiction
governing the Hyundai Motor Company was raised in question. The HMC
submitted itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of District court of USA,
67 Weidong Liu and Peter Dicken, “‘Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated
Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct Investment in China’s automobile industry” Environment
and Planning A, industry’ (Vol. 38, No. 7 (, 2006), pp., pages 1229 – 1247;) < http://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1068/a37206> accessed on 05/13/2018; Victor F.S. Sit
and W., Weidong Liu, “‘Restructuring and Spatial Change of China’s Auto Industry
under Institutional Reform and Globalization,” Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Globalization’ (Vol. 90, No. 4 (, 2000), pp., pages 653-673) < https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0004-5608.00216> accessed on 05/13/2018.
68 Hyundai Motors, ‘Globalization strategy 1967-2013’ <https://www.slideshare.net/
NomieFrontre/research-project-hyundai-group-globalisation-strategy> accessed on
05/17/2018.
69 See: THAAD = Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. It is basically a missile weapon
system and the United States deployed a battery of the THAAD weapon system in South
Korea. Lockheed Martin, ‘THAAD- Terminal High Altitude Area Defense’ < https://
www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/thaad.html> accesses on 05/ 22/2018.
70 Seung-Youn Oh, ‘Fragmented Liberalisation in the Chinese Automotive Industry: The
Political Logic behind Beijing Hyundai’s Success in the Chinese Market’ (The China
Quarterly 216, 2013: 920-945F) <https://repository.brynmawr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cg
i?article=1030&context=polisci_pubs> accessed on 05/22/2018.
71 Carlson v Hyundai motor Co. 164 F.3d 1160 )8th circuit 1999
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conforming to the law of the land. In addition, HMC has a legal department
in Korea which deals with foreign issues comprising of pre-entry and post entry.
Correspondingly, the foreign subsidiaries have their own legal departments to
deal with post entry issues which are governed by the subsidiary countries’ laws.
CHAPTER IV: DISCLOSURE AND COMPLIANCE REGIME
The Hyundai Motor Company’s disclosure regime has been of importance
particularly in respect of carbon emission, since it is an automobile industry
and, hence, faces tremendous pressure from global investors to reduce the
carbon emission. It has been a voluntary party to the carbon disclosure project
which requests disclosure on carbon risk and management from the 500 largest
global companies.72 As per the report released by CDP in 2016, Hyundai has
faced severe slamming, being addressed as laggards with E grades in the area
of supporting low carbon regulation, grade D in fleet emission and overall C
grade in performance, as can be seen in Figure 3.73 However, this is in contrast
to what has been disclosed by Hyundai Motor Company in its sustainability
report in 2017, where it disclosed that it has earned an A grade in carbon
disclosure project for the year 2016.74 The CDP grades the companies on
various performance indexes; however, it remains unclear as to which index
mentioned in the sustainability report has Hyundai graded as A.75 This shows
the inaccuracy and ambiguity of Hyundai in maintaining and reporting
disclosures. Moreover, the non-submission of information or failure to disclose
their data on water score has attracted an F grading by CBP in water issues.76
Kia Motors, which is another main subsidiary in the Hyundai Motor Group, is
one of top 16 automakers which have failed to respond to the climate change
72 Katie Southworth, ‘Corporate voluntary action: A valuable but incomplete solution
to climate change and energy security challenges’ <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1016/j.polsoc.2009.01.008> accessed on 05/10/2018.
73 CDP, ‘The A List’ <https://www.cdp.net/en/scores-2016> accessed on 05/18/2019.
74 Won Hee Lee (President and CEO), ‘2017 Sustainability report’ <https://csr.hyundai.
com/upfile/report/sar/Sustainability_Report_en_2017.pdf> accessed on 05/11/2019.
75 Ibid at 34
76 CDP, ‘The A List’ <https://www.cdp.net/en/scores-2017> accessed on 05/18/2019
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questionnaire and, thereby, were being graded F.77 The sustainability report
of Kia Motors has failed to disclose its non-adherence to the climate change
disclosure as required by CDP.78
However, even though Hyundai has been struggling to adhere to the carbon
regulation standards, its efforts could be seen in minimizing greenhouse
emissions by switching to eco-friendly vehicles. It has simultaneously been
trying to enforce low-carbon business policies and integrating them within its
production and sales network, percolating to its subsidiaries in other nations
as well, which can be seen in figure 4.79 Moreover, adoption of Hyundai Blue
Drive, which focuses on development of ecological vehicles and technology
to sustain low carbon emissions and minimize fuel consumption, shows their
drive towards environmental preservation.80
The other instance of Hyundai’s response to the disclosure regime is the
adoption of International Financing Reporting Standards which constitute the
“harmonized financial reporting requirements for multinational groups.”81 The
adoption of IFRS standards for accounting disclosures satisfies the national
corporate disclosure requirements of various states and, hence, is a widely
celebrated mechanism internationally for accounting disclosures. Hyundai,
which used K-GAAP, the general accounting standard in Korea, adopted K-IFRS
in 2011, to make business more conducive for foreign investors and to have an
accounting mechanism in line with international standards.82 In line with the
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid at 34
79 Hyundai, ‘CSR’ <https://csr.hyundai.com/ta_300_01.do?CSR_LOCALE_PARAM=en>
accessed on 05/18/2019
80 Ibid at 60
81 Katta Ashok Kumar, ‘International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS): Prospects and
Challenges’ (2014) Account Mark 3:111. doi:10.4172/2168-9601.1000111
82 Rebecca Henderson, ‘South Korea's Transition from K-GAAP to IFRS’ <https://
digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1162&context=honorstheses> accessed on 05/22/2019.
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new accounting law in place, Hyundai Motors maintains its audit committee
with 4 non-executive directors and one external auditor.83
The corporate governance reforms that gained momentum majorly in the
1990s became a governing point for all the corporates world-wide and focused
majorly on maintaining transparency and accountability of these big corporates.
The South Korean Securities and Exchange Commission, induced by various
corruption scandals, realized the importance of engraining corporate governance
reforms within the complex organizational structure of the Chaebol’s working
and adopted the Fair disclosure rule in 2002.84 The realization of the shift from
government steered corporate governance to shareholder oriented corporate
governance made the government to mandate Chaebols to create an external
board of directors to address the lack of independence issue and to reassure
stronger monitoring and more involvement of shareholders in decision
making.85 The other set of reforms mandated in the Chaebols, which was
rightly adopted by Hyundai, was to publish combined financial statements,
including of the domestic and overseas firms under its control.86 Hyundai
followed the disclosure regime, as was driven by these reforms adopted centrally
by the Korean government, which shows that Hyundai Motor Company did
react positively to the disclosure regimes from time to time.87 Keeping in line
with the above reforms, the independent audit committee of Hyundai has the
authority to access documents at any time and mandate a director to present
reports as and when required and inspect the assets status of the company.88
Moreover, the proactive adoption of disclosure regimes by Hyundai has not
only limited itself to mandates by the government or external forces, but
83 Ibid
84 Byung S. Min, ‘Corporate governance reform: the case of Korea’ (2016), 24:1, 2141, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2015.1106956
85 Ibid
86 Ibid
87 Nabyla Daidj, ‘Strategy-, Structure- and- Corporate-Governance-Expressing-inter-firmnetworks/Daidj/p/book/9781472452924 Governance’ (2016-Routledge)
88 Ibid
50

The Hyundai Model: A Quasi-Leviathan in the Making

Hyundai has also learnt lessons from its peers and is taking actions based on
how laws are applied to the other corporations. For instance, Deloitte Korea
which was the second largest accounting firm in South Korea and was working
for KIA Motors until 2017 was alleged and, eventually, disqualified for not
complying with the laws which induced Hyundai Motors to leak its plan on
changing its accounting firm to Deloitte Korea. This leaked plan of switching
to a different accounting firm forced the current accounting firm of Hyundai
to comply with the law.89
The disclosure regime adopted by Hyundai has not only made Hyundai’s
reach in international markets commendable owing to its adaptability to the
stringent disclosure regime in consonance with international requirement, but
has also displayed its self-governance in self-regulating itself by complying to
the disclosure requirements as mandated by different nations with the presence
of Hyundai subsidiary. This will be expounded in the next section, along with
how the Company learnt lessons from its other affiliates and brought itself in
compliance with the law.
Compliance Regime: This section shall promulgate the changes brought about
by Hyundai in its internal regulation due to the change brought about by laws
in the host country of its subsidiaries or due to the change in the home country
laws, by way of case laws. This section further promulgates how desecrations
by subsidiary company can endow liability on the parent company, and how
Hyundai Motor Company has embedded those despoliations in its internal
regulations to further avoid such violations and remain in compliance with
laws of other nations.
In the case of United States of America & California Air Resource Board v
HMC and HMA & Ors.,90 defendants’ violation was attributed to the inability
of defendants to report road load force in certificates of conformity which led
89 Deloitte Anjin, ‘Scandal-hit Deloitte Anjin loses 50 key clients’ (19 April 2017) <http://
www.theinvestor.co.kr/view.php?ud=20170419000921> accessed on 05/10/ 2019.
90 United States of America & California Air Resource Board v HMC and HMA & Ors.
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to lower fuel economy and increased emissions of air pollutants than reported,
particularly greenhouse gases. The nonconformity resulted from Defendants’
improper testing, analysis91. The violation that accrued on the level of Hyundai
Motors America endowed liability on all other defendants since all form part
of Hyundai Motor Group and since the operations are interrelated including
sharing testing facilities and personnel the liability was shared by all which
can also be illustrated by the organisational structure of Hyundai Motors as
explained in the second chapter of the paper.
The settlement that was reached mandated the defendants to pay $100 million
penalty, along with corrective measures which included reorganisation of their
certification group, revising test protocols, improvement of management
of test data, enhancing employee training and forfeiting GNG emission
credits.92 Hyundai Motors, in compliance with these mandates, changed their
working, which led to their ranking in reducing greenhouse emission gases93
from 11 to 3.94 The change in the governmental policy wherein South Korea
ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016, post this case, helped them easily adapt
to the policies as they were introduced by the national government since they
were already in place.
The next case study deals with how, due to the introduction of policies in the
country of their subsidiaries, a change had to be brought in the parent company
and, by virtue of that, had to be complied with by all its subsidiaries in other
countries.
The European Union had passed a new chemical law called REACH95 which
stood for registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals.
91 California Air Resources Board v. Hyundai Motor Company; Hyundai Motor America;
Kia Motors Corporation; Kia Motors America; Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc.
[2014] 1:14-cv-01837
92 Margo T. Oge, Catherine Witherspoon, ‘Memorandum of Agreement between EPA and
California Air Resources Board’ (2004) (3 pp, 204)
93 Figure 5
94 Ibid at 60
95 European Commission, ‘Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’ <http://
ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/restrictions_en> accessed 05/15/2018
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Under this legislation, EU had banned the use of four major heavy metals in
the territory of European Union. Hyundai Motors, in order to comply with
the law passed in the European Union, the country of their wholly owned
subsidiary, introduced a chemical substance management system and introduced
a database that accumulated all information on chemical materials being
used in manufacturing of its vehicles and parts, inside and outside Korea, in
order to curb the usage of chemicals not only subjected to EU REACH, but
also substances which are likely to be subjected to restrictions in the future,
to minimize regulatory risks.96 In furtherance of mandating the Hyundai
Subsidiaries and its parent company to ban the usage of heavy metals in parts
and materials in its new vehicles, it created a ‘global standard for four major
heavy metals’ which prohibited such use.97 This was enforced in the EU for all
the new vehicles sold after July 1, 2003, and the prohibition was applied in Korea
for new cars sold after 2008 and was further expanded to all overseas markets
in 2009.98 Till date Hyundai remains entirely compliant with this rule. The
case study mentioned shows how Hyundai has been forthcoming in adopting
and amending its internal regulations to come in compliance with laws passed
in other countries and making it, internally, a responsible corporate. Moreover,
the steps taken by Hyundai show its concern to the heated hue and cry created
about climate change, and rightly so, which, also, shows its compliance to
international standards. However, Hyundai as a company has not been all
positives specifically in respect of Labor and employee Unionization. Even
though there were changes brought by parent company due to organisational
change and law being changed in Korea, the subsidiaries did not potentially
adopt it. In Korea, due to mass upsurge by Labourers and employees and
dominant working of chaebols, government insisted that all chaebols must
recognize union of labourers. HMC was mandated to hold talks with Union
Movements owing to organisational strength and changes brought about in
96 Ibid
97 Mong-Koo Chung (Chairman), ‘2013 Sustainability Report’ <http://csr.hyundai.
com/upfile/report/sar/Sustainability_Report%28ENG%29_2013.pdf> accessed on
05/11/2018
98 Ibid at 60
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the legislation of Korea.99 In spite of the mandate by the Korean government
to make the Union Movement stronger, Hyundai has always been against
forming trade unions. This could be inferred from its failed stint in Quebec,
where its first plant was opened, owing to labour disputes, failure of HMC100
to manage cordial relationship with its managers and employees and to avoid
unionization of the plant.101 The tactics used by Hyundai, though they seemed
subtle, became apparent when employees who were thought to be in favour
of organizing unions were suspended, transferred or dismissed. Moreover the
tactic of ‘Silent Majority’ adopted by HMC, which propagated pro-company
and anti-union strategy, showed the subtle yet significant steps by HMC to
avoid unionization.
However, even with the change in laws and mandate on the parent company
owing to changes brought about in legislation in Korea, HMC did not allow
this to trickle down to the working of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, specifically
in India. HMC opened its plant in Tamil Nadu, as the union movement in
that area was not apparent or dominant. Hyundai has so far been able to
avoid unionization in India as can be expounded by the fact that HMIEU is
a registered union, but is not recognized by the Hyundai Motor India Ltd.
management, and hence HMI has been able to remain union free.102 The case
study of Hyundai Motors exemplifies the complicated impact on employeremployee relations in the wake of globalization. The interplay of local, global
and internal forces within the company shapes the policies adopted by a
company when transcending boundaries and establishing its plants in other
countries.
99 See: Furthermore, since the ‘democratisation’ of Korea in 1987, collective bargaining rights
have been extended to unions, and the employers have faced an increasingly unionised
workforce. Seoghun Woo, S. ‘perspectives 21st Century: Perspectives on Korean….,’
Economic and Labour Relations Review, Industrial Relations’ (1997) vol. 8, no. issue 1,
pp. page(s):22–43.>.
100 Teal, G. (1995) Korean management, corporate culture and systems of labour control
between South Korea and North America, Culture, 15(2), pp. 85–103 7
101 Ibid at 24 , Ibid at 39
102 Rajesh Chandramoulil, ‘Hyundai Workers form Union’ The Times of India (Chennai,
11/22/2011)
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The above case studies show how Hyundai has been compliant in framing
its rules, regulations and internal policies in adherence to the change in
globalisation trend and the change in the policies and laws in the host countries
which has had the effect of Hyundai bringing in changes in its internal policies
of its parent company and has had the effect of adapting its wholly owned
subsidiaries to such changes in other countries. Additionally, changes brought
about in the parent company, working in response to change in laws of the
host country, has also impacted the working of its subsidiaries in host countries
which shows the close knit and centralised organisational structure of Hyundai
Motor Company.
CHAPTER V: INTRODUCTION TO CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility has achieved a new dimension owing to
the much-settled debate now over corporates giving back to society. CSR
includes everything and anything that corporate does for the benefit of its
stakeholders. The nature of beneficial activity can take any form, voluntary,
legal, self-regulatory, all comes within the umbrella of CSR.103 The expansive
scope that CSR has come to achieve has culminated into a new form of
corporate governance. This corporate governance is much required owing to
the accelerated internationalization which has limited the power of nations,
territorially, and also the authority to sanction for want of regulatory power.
This new form of corporate governance which has shaped itself into a new
form of societal governance104 has put extra pressure on states to implement
CSR in driving its economy, which is being facilitated by these big corporates
either by way of self-regulation or collective standards and systems. The limited
resources available with states has called for other entities to contribute in
achieving social well-being, and rightly so. The mandate of CSR has pursued
103 McBarnet, ‘Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law’ (2009) Edinburgh,
School of Law, Working Papers<https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14183638/
SSRN_id1369305.pdf> accessed 05/18/2018
104 Jeremy Moon, ‘The contribution of Corporate Social Responsibility to Sustainable
Development’ (2007) Volume 15, Issue 5 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
abs/10.1002/sd.346> accessed 05/15/2019
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corporations to take into consideration labor policies, employee well-being,
etc., which has made these corporations far more answerable and responsible
to the people.105 Moreover, with the power that these corporations have been
witnessing and have come to exert, they can be called a mega corporation.
Further, this statement holds true in South Korea due to the momentous power
and size of the Chaebols and their impact on the economy of South Korea.
Korean Companies’ drive towards CSR has been relatively recent. The interplay
of various factors like pressure from NGOs, self-interest, profit, etc., has
increased the companies’ issuing of their sustainability report from 4 in 2003
to over 80 at present.106 The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), impelled by
deliberations on ISO 26000 indexes, persuaded the Federation to pass a formal
resolution to increase the social involvement of its organizational members.
Deriving its power from this commitment, FKI formed a CSR committee to
monitor Member Companies’ social, moral, and legal responsibilities.107 The
awareness of CSR amongst the Korean companies is more or less related to
philanthropy. It has been argued that the Korean companies majorly adopt
giving of donations in order to cover the practices of corruption and hide the
precarious employment conditions.108
The move towards CSR has further been fuelled in the direction of green
management, owing to Lee Myung-bak administration portraying South Korea
as an environment-friendly country. Contrastingly, South Korea’s reliance on
nuclear energy and building of a dam affecting the ecosystem109 has raised
105 Ramon Mullerat, ‘the Economic Order of the 21 st Century’ [2010] (Kluwer Law
International 2009)
106 Tae-Hyun, ‘LG Electronics union declares social responsibility of union’ <http://www.
edaily.co.kr/news/news_detail.asp?newsId=01662966592842312&mediaCodeNo=257>
accessed on 05/19/2019
107 BBC News, ‘South Korea country profile’ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiapacific-15289563> accessed on 05/19/2018
108 Wol-san Liem, ‘Corporations, Unions, and CSR in South Korea’ < https://amrc.org.hk/
content/corporations-unions-and-csr-south-korea> accessed 05/18/2018.
109 Ibid
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arguments about its “go green policy” being a marketing gimmick and, thereby,
refuting its stand of being a champion of the environment. The positive move
of Korean companies towards CSR is further diluted by the fact that it still
remains quite weak in its labor and human rights categories. This is due to
the practice of Korean companies suppressing Unions and engaging in unfair
practices to dissuade workers to form Unions. This can be illustrated from the
example of Hyundai Motor Company which has met with criticism from all
corners in all of its subsidiaries for not allowing workers to form Unions or
not recognizing the unions. This was apparent from the strikes that were being
witnessed at various plants of Hyundai. However, over the period of HMC’s
membership with Korean Federation of Trade Union,110 the parent company
has moved towards a more inclusive and cooperative approach to maintain
employment relations.111
The company, in pursuance of becoming a more responsible citizen,
implemented an extensive welfare system, trainings were increased, union
members were made part of project teams and wages were substantially
increased. The benefits were not only given to managers, but also to the Union
Members.112 The move of HMC towards CSR became more apparent when
it established its Ethics Charter and Employee Code of Conduct in 2001.113
The company also introduced Fair Trade compliance program114 and became
a signatory to the UN Global Compact.115 It has also implemented the Fair
110 Jiyeoun Song, J. ‘Economic distress, labor market reforms, and dualism in Japan and
Korea’ (2012, 25, 415–438) accessed 05/20/2018.
111 Cho, H.J. ‘The employment adjustment of Hyundai Motor Company: A research focus
on corporate-level labour relations.’ Korean J. Lab. Stud. 1999, 5, 63–96. )
112 Ibid at 39
113 Heung-Jun Jung, Mohammad Ali, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Organizational
Justice and Positive Employee Attitudes: In the Context of Korean Employment Relations
<file:///C:/Users/Vivan%20Shah/Downloads/sustainability-09-01992.pdf> accessed on
05/20/2019
114 ‘2013 Sustainability Report’ <http://csr.hyundai.com/upfile/report/sar/Sustainability_
Report%28ENG%29_2013.pdf> accessed 05/16/2019.
115 Ibid
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Trade Agreement with its suppliers, which shall be implemented in three
phases.116 Moreover, it has published sustainability reports which have met
the parameters of G3.1 Global Reporting Initiative guidelines and gets the
data verified from an outside expert to increase its authenticity.117 The 2013
report118 illustrates its commitment towards a comprehensive and collaborative
approach to attain business goals, which can be seen from its multi-stakeholder
philosophy which promulgates three key approaches: “a sense of unlimited
responsibility (signifying stakeholder responsibilities and sustainable growth),
the realization of possibilities (signifying imaginative ideas and innovation),
and love for humanity (signifying the contribution of humanity).”119
The growth of HMC as a socially responsible corporate was not mandated by
any specific legislation, but Hyundai has always been proactive in responding
to the changing needs in the international community. This can be illustrated
by its dominance in the automobile market in the world in such a short span
of time. Hyundai has not only contributed philanthropically, but has also
adopted mechanisms to control pollution and emissions which remain the
major concern of automobile production companies. Moreover, the ability of
HMC to self-regulate itself in response to the soft law has marked its image
as one of those companies which has not indulged in CSR merely for profit.
The much heated ‘dieselgate’ scandal that had hit India owing to Volkswagen
automobile company manipulating and cheating, with data which showed that
cars met the emission norms in a test environment even though the cars running
on the road had nine times more emissions than the permissible limit, showed
how difficult it was for automobile companies to meet the emission norms as
were set by host countries’ Environment Protection Agencies.120 This scandal
116
117
118
119
120

Ibid at 99
Ibid at 100
Ibid at 100
Ibid at 39.
Leah Mcgrath Goodman, ‘Why Volkswagen Cheated’ <http://www.newsweek.
com/2015/12/25/why-volkswagen-cheated-404891.html> accessed 05/22/2019
58

The Hyundai Model: A Quasi-Leviathan in the Making

was a follow up to a previous recall in Europe, where it was conceded that 11
million diesel cars were fitted with defeat device to ‘greyball’ emission norms.121
Hyundai, in the wake of controversies surrounding the automobile industry,
introduced IONIQ a range of eco-friendly car models in order to expand
the eco-friendly car market and to maintain environment sustainability.122
Furthermore, Hyundai started the “Go Green” village adoption program in
Tamil Nadu, India, in order to promote environment and forest cover in the
state of Tamil Nadu.
Hyundai’s stint has not only been active in promoting environment protection
schemes, but has also been successful to a great extent in eliminating a
much-entrenched problem in the Korean Chaebol market: corruption. The
conglomerates in Korea were the main contributors to the GDP of the country,
and since government was intervening with the development of the economy,
it made economic policies in favor of these conglomerates. In response to the
favorable policies by the government, the conglomerates were obligated to
submit to the political power by bribing them. The intensity of corruption
in the South Korean Market including Hyundai could be witnessed from the
arrest of Hyundai Motors head, Chung Mong Koo, in 2006 for embezzling
$106 million.123 With a lack of specific legislation on combating corruption,
coupled with failure of existing legal mechanisms, public officials could not
control this menace. This was further aggravated when lobbying corruption
charges were levied against head of Hyundai Automotive’s logistics unit, Glovis,
for embezzling funds up to $7.1 million. The Korean Market, including all
major conglomerates, was being severely criticized on the international front
by all the major stakeholders and other countries.

121 ‘Volkswagen submits roadmap on recall of 3.23 lakh cars before NGT’ The Times of India
(New Delhi, 18 Aug 2017)
122 Ibid at 100
123 Choe Sang-Hun, ‘Hyundai chief is arrested on fraud charges’ The New York Times (Seoul,
28 April 2006)
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In response to these corruption charges, Hyundai set up a Cyber Audit Office
in 2004124 to collect data and information on all unethical business practices
including bribery and corruption and to provide consultations to employees
facing ethical dilemma. Under this move, Hyundai had instilled a whistle
blowing protection, where the complainant’s identity shall not be disclosed
under the policy of secret assurance and identity protection assurance. Specific
departments were equipped to deal with specific issues related to human rights,
labor issues, etc.125
With the enforcement of Improper Solicitation and Graft Act 2016, it made
it illegal for public officials to accept gifts, with a cap of certain amount in
wedding or funerals, with the objective of combating corruption.126 However,
owing to the widespread criticism being drawn to Hyundai from stakeholders
over bribery charges, Hyundai self-regulated itself much before the act came
into being.
Additionally, the signing up of Hyundai, voluntarily, in the UN Global
Compact which is derived from UDHR, International Labour Organisation’s
declaration on fundamental principles on Right at Work, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, The United Nations Convention against
Corruption, etc., shows its commitment to become a responsible corporate in
the wake of self-regulation.
The other practices adopted by HMC which shows its commitment to society
includes its project Hyundai Hope on Wheels in America, wherein it awards
research grants to fight paediatric cancer. This project raised $14 Million in
2014 and has been in existence since 1998. It has not only transformed the fight
124 Hyundai Motor Company, ‘Annual REPORT 2002’ <https://www.hyundai.com/content/
dam/hyundai/ww/en/images/about-hyundai/ir/financial-statements/annual-report/
hw026555.pdf> accessed 05/24/2019.
125 Ibid
126 See: Clifford Chance’s Asia Pacific Anti-Corruption Group by Wendy Wysong. Wendy
Wysong, ‘Foreign Legal Consultant (Hong Kong); Partner (Washington DC)’ <https://
www.cliffordchance.com/people_and_places/people/partners/cn/wendy_wysong.html>
accessed 05/25/2019
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against paediatric cancer disease by providing funding, but has also brought
the entire community of those affected by this cancer together.127
Hyundai striving to become socially responsible is exemplified by its rank at 1 in
an index measuring CSR among companies in China. It has seen a growth from
17th ranking in 2014, to 3rd in 2016 and 1st in 2017. The program undertaken
by Hyundai has been to combat desertification in China’s Inner Mongolia and
has been, so far, extremely successful in doing so. Kia and Hyundai have not only
helped in reconstructing impoverished areas, but have also provided education
to children about road safety by conducting after school programs. As part of
its efforts, in 2011, Hyundai was able to transform 30 square kilometres of
desert into grassland in an attempt to maintain conservation efforts.128
CHAPTER VI: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
The supply chain of a company promulgates the functioning of the company,
beginning from raw material suppliers, assemblers and sub assemblers,
distribution channels and end consumers.129 The objective of SCM is to
coordinate and integrate the information within the supply chain to make it
more responsive to the consumers, and at the same time, to reduce the overall
cost borne by the company. Attaining synchronization of information at
different levels in the supply chain is a grueling task. Supply chain management
demands a shift from functional specialization to horizontal integration of
functional activities.130

127 Calif, ‘Hyundai Hope on Wheels completes a successful fifth Annual National September
as Childhood Cancer Awareness Month Campaign’ Press Releases (Fountain Valley, 9 Oct
2014)
128 Park Hyong-ki, ‘Hyundai Motor: most socially responsible Company in China’ The
Korean Times <https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/01/419_242862.html>
accessed 05/25/2019.
129 Chan K. Hahn, Edward A. Duplaga, Janet L. Hartley, ‘Supply-Chain Synchronization:
Lessons from Hyundai Motor Company’ <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2e03/8ed9
5f07e20d91ca5ed864df975b2891626a.pdf> accessed 05/25/2019.
130 Ibid
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Hyundai Motor Company started its car production by importing components
from Ford Motor Company in 1968. By 1975, it became the first Korean
automaker to integrate its manufacturing facilities.131 Additionally, in order
to address the interplay of various factors simultaneously, such as reducing
overall cost and reducing the delivery time while increasing the product
quality, Hyundai established a production and sales (P/SC) department to
mediate on the “conflicts between manufacturing, the domestic and export
sales departments, and the domestic and foreign purchasing departments.”132
The approach adopted by Hyundai to coordinate these was using a centralized
approach, because majority of its manufacturing facility was restricted to
Ulsan plant in Korea. The P/SC department has the function of synchronizing
production planning across all facilities.133 By way of establishing P/SC
department, Hyundai Motors created its own internal governance mechanism
to deal with all dealerships and production plants around the globe under one
roof and to integrate them. The P/SC department, by way of cross-functional
meetings and centralizing production scheduling, coordinated the supplychain activities. Hyundai Motors, instead of increasing productivity, shifted to
sales forecast prediction, and responding to such prediction, Hyundai Motors
revamped their supply chain management in 2005 and gave the role of sales
forecasting to dealership (their role shifted from selling cars to majorly reporting
sales forecast) around the globe, to optimize their strategy of quick response
on the basis of sales forecast predictions, thereby, strengthening and effectively
controlling their supply-chain management.134
From dealers accumulating data around the globe, to production planning
department informing them about the plant capacity on the basis of which P/
SC develops preliminary production plans, and on the basis of which P/SC
works with suppliers to acquire parts, and then develops production schedules
which conclude with a master production plan - the working of the P/SC
131
132
133
134
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department substantially indicates the integrated supply chain perspective
adopted by Hyundai during the planning process.135
The approach adopted by Hyundai illustrated the model of a closed supply
chain which constitutes of a “highly integrated set of networks in which
many of the technologies being applied are developed at least partially by the
company orchestrating the supply chain.”136 Hyundai Motor Company, for
the longest time, kept the manufacturing facilities centralized to Ulsan plant
and orchestrated the supply chain from Korea.
Initially most of the companies followed the closed supply chain model. For
instance, Henry Ford owned the forests, iron ore and steel that constituted its
various segments of vertically integrated supply chain. The strategy adopted
by Henry Ford included centralized control over all key value chain aspects,
including the control over raw materials.137 Owing to various innovations and
expansive scope to reach customers, the supply chain coordination was endowed
on OEMs. OEMs controlled the major aspects of the vehicle, which included
quality, aesthetics and performance which constitute around 30% of the price
of the automobile. Owing to such substantial amounts in the hands of OEMs,
there has been a shift yet again towards closed supply chain management.138
This shift can also be attributed to the willingness of the companies to enjoy
substantial control over the innovations and associated intellectual property
and, majorly, over input pricing.139
Hyundai Motors reemphasized its reliance on closed supply chain network in the
supply of steel. Hyundai was looking for alloys of steel that could substantially
decrease the weight of its new cars. Instead of relying solely on two global
135 Ibid at 115
136 Ibid at 115
137 Bob Ferrari, ‘PRESCRIPTIVE OR PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS’ <https://www.
theferrarigroup.com/supply-chain-matters/2011/11/hyundai-moves-closer-to-closedsupply-chain-network-model/> accessed 05/27/2019.
138 Ibid
139 ibid
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steel suppliers, it invested $8 Billion in Hyundai Steel (a company within the
Chaebol) to induce innovation in the company and increase its capacity.140
Hyundai move towards closed supply chain for steel could be a result of both
factors mentioned above, since steel forms the main part of body panels, and
by integrating its production within the supply chain, it can help drive down
the cost. Moreover, having some control over the production of steel can also
save them from highly fluctuating prices.
The closed supply chain model of Hyundai can also be illustrated by the
centralization of all logistic activities of Hyundai-Kia Motors to Hyundai
GLOVIS for the first-tier supply role.141 Hyundai GLOVIS is entrusted with all
the functions related to logistics process for production and sales of automobiles,
including delivering auto-parts for final assemblage, just in time delivery
of finished vehicles,142 transporting vehicle to other places and to regional
warehouses and providing the tracking information on every product that goes
out of their warehouse to Hyundai Company.143 Moreover Hyundai GLOVIS
used bar code labels to the parts boxes, which made it extremely difficult to
automate distribution and obtain accurate distribution information.144 In order
to overcome the burden of increased cost of human errors during repacking,
GLOVIS shifted to Radio-frequency identification which uses “electromagnetic
fields to automatically identify and track tags attached to objects.145” The SCM
140 ibid
141 ibid
142 Just-in-time (JIT) is an inventory strategy companies employ to increase efficiency and
decrease waste by receiving goods only as they are needed in the production process,
thereby reducing inventory costs. This method requires producers to forecast demand
accurately. Investopedia Academy, ‘Just In Time-JIT’ <https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/j/jit.asp#ixzz5GgxnNN9b> accessed 05/26/2019.
143 Huafeng Zhou, Zhenming Gu, ‘SCM 303 Introduction to Supply Chain Management’
<http://scm303.blogspot.in/2014/06/hyundai-special-logistic-management.html>
accessed 05/26/2019.
144 Andrew Price, ‘RFID Enhances Supply Chain Management for Automotive Parts at
Hyundai/Kia Motors’ (2007) <https://www.rfidjournal.com/purchaseaccess?type=Articl
e&id=3208&r=%2Farticles%2Fview%3F3208> accessed 05/27/2019.
145 IGI Global: Disseminator of Knowledge, ‘What is RFID’ <https://www.igi-global.com/
dictionary/communicame/25361> accessed 05/23/2-018.
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integrated with RFID technology automatically taps down the entire report for
each process when a particular box passes through the RFID interrogator. It
further provides a comprehensive detailed delivery status report which includes
information on dispatch from the distribution center to prediction of arrival at
port for export and arrival oversees at various Hyundai-Kia Motors factories.146
Hyundai GLOVIS, in entirety, handles the total transportation system of raw
material shipping business and offers real-time distribution information to
Hyundai/ Kia Motors, which makes them have a stronger control over the
inventory and production plans, thereby optimizing the logistics and production
costs.
The centralized and integrated supply chain management strategy adopted
by Hyundai had both positives and negatives. In 2003, the company was
hit with tremendous disruption owing to a 47-day strike, due to which the
supply network did not remain completely resolute.147 The centralization
and integration of manufacturing parts and supplies at Ulsan Plant in Korea,
and the decision on not having manufacturing plants in advanced markets
but, substantially, relying on importing it from Ulsan plant, led to Hyundai
European supply network in specific to suffer, as it was majorly dependent on
the Korean plant for Complete Knockdown kits.148 Even though Hyundai was
able to cope up due to close-knit control over the entire supply network, which
aided them in coordinating accelerated international logistics and, hence, better
reach to customers, the excess reliance on Ulsan plant cost them a lot of money.
146 Ibid at 130
147 Sanjib Dutta, E Agrawal, ‘HR Problems in Hyundai Motor Co’ <https://www.
thecasecentre.org/educators/products/view?id=20222> accessed 05/ 25/2019.
148 See: CKD is the keyword. CKD stands for Completely Knocked Down. The term has
its origin in the automotive industry and refers to a form of production of vehicles. The
car manufacturer exports a not-assembled vehicle in the form of individual parts that
is assembled into a finished vehicle in the respective country of import and sold there.
Stefgoettler, ‘Completely knocked down. What does it mean and why is it used’ <https://
logisticsmgepsupv.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/completely-knocked-down-what-does-itmean-and-why-is-it-used/> accessed 05/26/2019.
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The Indian plant remained unaffected due to its low dependence on supplies
from Korea, emphasizing a flexible approach to supply chain management.149
Contrastingly, a close vigilance over the supply-chain proved beneficial when
Hyundai initiated National Green Supply Chain in 2003,150 as can be seen in
Figure 6. This mandated the suppliers to put an environment management
system into place and make sure that the products are free from any hazardous
substances as was induced by REACH legislation in EU.151 The vigilance
over supply chain by Hyundai has not only aided them in monitoring the
environmental performance, but has helped under-resourced suppliers
to establish effective green management systems.152 Hyundai has signed
environment-friendly parts supply agreements with its first-tier suppliers since
2007, and by 2012 all domestic suppliers signed the agreement.153 Post 2012,
Hyundai instituted signing of this agreement with its European suppliers.
This shows the internal governance that Hyundai has come to achieve over
its suppliers by keeping a close vigil on its working and mandating them to
act in compliance with international and domestic norms. The supply chain
management under green partnership program can be seen in the figure below.154
CONCLUSION
Hyundai Motor Company which started off as a small fish in a big sea (Hyundai
Conglomerate) paved its way out successfully and established itself as an
149 UKESSAYS, ‘Supply Chain Risk in the Hyundai Motor Company’ <https://www.ukessays.
com/dissertation/literature-review/business/supply-chain-risk-and-vulnerability.php>
accessed 05/ 27/2019.
150 Seung Lee, Soo Kyung Kim and Su-Yol Lee, ‘Sustainable Supply Chain Capabilities:
Accumulation, Strategic Types and Performance’ < file:///C:/Users/SHREYA/Desktop/
sustainability-08-00503.pdf> accessed 05/26/2018.
151 Ibid
152 Donghyun Choi, Taewon. Hwang, ‘The impact of green supply chain management
practices on firm performance: the role of collaborative capability’ (2015) 8: 69. <https://
doi.org/10.1007/s12063-015-0100-x> accessed 05/25/2019.
153 Ibid at 136
154 Making Life Better, ‘3 Suppliers’ <https://csr.hyundai.com/upfile/report/pdf/partner.
PDF> accessed 05/27/2019.
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independent group from the conglomerate. During the crises, it efficaciously
understood the ill effects of bearing the burden of failing companies within
the conglomerate and the burden to be borne by successful companies. This
induced them to form a separate, yet one of the biggest and most influential,
conglomerates in South Korea. The drive of Hyundai Motors to become
one of the biggest names in Automobile market in the world could be seen
through its adaptability to international laws and its ability to conform to the
domestic laws of the host country. Even though it expanded exponentially
internationally, it never lost sight of its basic organizational structure which,
till date, they have kept extremely centralized. It could be inferred from the
fact that all the companies that existed under the umbrella of Hyundai Motor
Group provided Hyundai everything from raw materials to the end products
being sent out to the consumer, which shows the extremely integrated and close
knit working. In continuance of its policy to maintain centralized decision
making, Hyundai adopted ‘wholly owned subsidiary’ as its model to enter into
host countries. This model was an extension to its Business model of keeping
everything within the close confines of its parent company. Even though the
companies were established in various parts of the world, the parent company
substantially effectuated control over its subsidiaries in all matters, except in
China. Hyundai Motors is the perfect example of a company which learnt
from its failures. The failure of its Quebec plant made it realize the importance
of adapting to the local market requirements, which they then engrained in
their eventual expansion. The company did not fail in understanding how
important disclosures were for the successful and transparent functioning of
the company. Hyundai has always been extremely transparent in maintaining
its disclosures, as well as conceding their faults and correcting them, which was
illustrated in various cases. Moreover, the willingness of Hyundai to adapt to
changing laws in host countries and bringing the change in to the working of
the parent company, as well as trickling it down to other subsidiaries, shows
how it allowed itself to be regulated when required, and then adopted selfregulation where it saw the policy to be beneficial for their company. They also
realized at a very early stage, unlike other conglomerates in South Korea, the
importance of giving back to society, which made them compete in CSR with
other leading automobile manufacturers and surpassing a lot of other companies
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to become CSR compliant. Keeping in mind their organizational strategy,
the supply-chain management of Hyundai Motors was extremely centralized
and integrated, which made them a regulator of themselves. Hyundai Motor
Company has outperformed its competitors by being flexible enough to adapt
to changes and rigid enough to keep decision making under one roof, which
has proved to be a successful business model for HMC till now. The extreme
centralization brought in by Hyundai in its supply chain management shows
its resemblance to a modern ‘guild’ in its functioning by keeping control at all
steps of production, distribution and supply. However, the close knit working
of Hyundai has majorly worked in its favor, and the momentous growth and
impact it has come to exert in the automobile industry in the world, which to
a great extent could be credited to its governance structure and, some of it, to
its ability to adapt to the changing environment and, also, being wary of the
reprehensible nature of the business environment, it could be rightly said that it
is a mega corporation, or a mega corporation in the making, but not an evil one.

Figure 1: The Holding Structure of Chung Family
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Figure 2: Vertical Investment Equity Structure of Hyundai Group

Figure 3: CDP Annual Performance Index
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